Fiscal Consequences of Corporate Tax Avoidance

Katarzyna Bilicka, Evgeniya Dubinina and Janský, Petr
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Petr Janský

No 18139, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the consequences of multinational tax avoidance on the structure of government tax revenues. To motivate our analysis, we show that countries with high revenue losses due to profit shifting have lower corporate tax revenues and rates and higher indirect tax revenues and rates. To establish causality, we use German municipal data and analyse how changes in municipal trade tax rates levied on corporate profits affect local tax revenue structure. Following a trade tax rate increase, we find that municipalities with high exposure to aggressive multinationals experience a significant decline in trade tax revenue levels and shares.

JEL-codes: E62 H26 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal consequences of corporate tax avoidance (2026)
Working Paper: Fiscal Consequences of Corporate Tax Avoidance (2023)
Working Paper: Fiscal Consequences of Corporate Tax Avoidance (2023)
Working Paper: Fiscal Consequences of Corporate Tax Avoidance (2023)
Working Paper: Fiscal Consequences of Corporate Tax Avoidance (2023)
Working Paper: Fiscal consequences of corporate tax avoidance (2022)
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