The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-seeking Elites

Arthur Silve and Thierry Verdier

No 18165, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We introduce a dynamic model that investigates the persistence and evolution of elite-dominated societies, where inherited political capital determines one’s social standing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the distribution of exit options in the evolution of political inclusiveness across generations. An elite comparatively more mobile than the masses generally entrenches a politically stratified society, whereas a more widespread distribution of exit options can encourage inclusiveness. Under certain conditions differential mobility may still induce political inclusiveness across generations. Exit options across different political entities lead to a joint evolution of local power structures.

JEL-codes: D72 F42 H26 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
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Working Paper: The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-Seeking Elites (2023)
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