Regulating Online Search in the EU: From the Android Case to the Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act

Francesco Decarolis and Muxin Li ()

No 18177, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of the impacts of public regulations of internet search. Through a theoretical model, we consider three regulations adopted by the EU. The first is the Android choice screen implemented in the European Economic Area in 2020. The other two are the recently adopted Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA). We find that interventions involving user choice, like the Android choice screen, can be strengthened by other interventions focused on search engine quality and data portability. Since the regulations in the DMA target these multiple dimensions simultaneously, we expect it to deliver the strongest and most effective impacts on the online search market. We also argue that the impacts of the regulations may vary over different time horizons: when first implemented, the DSA may simply direct users to search engines with better privacy protection, but over time it has the potential to change user tastes for privacy and, hence, drive search engines to invest more in privacy protection.

Keywords: Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L81 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
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