Bank Competition and Household Privacy in a Digital Payment Monopoly

Itai Agur, Anil Ari and Giovanni Dell'ariccia

No 18288, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Lenders can exploit households' payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and attaining better credit conditions. We study how introducing an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects households' cash use, credit access, and welfare. A tech monopolist controls the intrusiveness of the new payment method and manipulates information asymmetries among households and oligopolistic banks to extract data contracts that are more lucrative than lending on its own. The laissez-faire equilibrium entails a digital payment vehicle that is more intrusive than socially optimal, providing a rationale for regulation.

JEL-codes: D82 E41 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18288 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bank competition and household privacy in a digital payment monopoly (2025)
Working Paper: Bank Competition and Household Privacy in a Digital Payment Monopoly (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18288

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18288

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().