The Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism: Theory and Evidence

Luca Bellodi, Massimo Morelli, Nicolò, Antonio and Paolo Roberti

No 18338, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper presents a theory of populism centered on commitment politics – a type of agency relationship in which political candidates promise specific and monitorable policies. The shift to commitment politics is driven by increased distrust toward government institutions, which is itself a consequence of the cognitive complexity and disinformation typical of modern social media environments. In equilibrium, candidates who adopt a commitment platform rationally choose all the complementary strategies associated with populism, including anti-elite rhetoric, misinformation, aversion to judicial independence, and bureaucratic expertise. The paper presents observational and experimental evidence from the United States on the supply (candidates’ rhetoric) and demand of commitment (voters’ preferences) consistent with the model’s key predictions.

Keywords: Populism; Commitment; Anti-elite rhetoric; Trust; Turnout; Agencies of restraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
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