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Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption

Shota Ichihashi and Alex Smolin

No 18476, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze a bilateral trade model in which the buyer's value for the product and the seller's costs are uncertain, the seller chooses the product price, and the product is recommended by an algorithm based on its value and price. We characterize an algorithm that maximizes the buyer's expected payoff and show that the optimal algorithm underrecommends the product at high prices and overrecommends at low prices. Higher algorithm precision increases the maximal equilibrium price and may increase prices across all of the seller's costs, whereas informing the seller about the buyer's value results in a mean-preserving spread of equilibrium prices and a mean-preserving contraction of the buyer's payoff.

Keywords: Algorithmic; consumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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Working Paper: Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption (2023) Downloads
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