The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium

Rossi Abi-Rafeh, Pierre Dubois, Rachel Griffith and Martin O'Connell

No 18527, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of firm competition to analyze the effects of counterfactual policies, such as taxes and advertising restrictions, on pricing, advertising, consumption, and welfare. Using micro-level data, we estimate how consumer exposure to television commercials influences product choice and model firms' strategic competition over advertising budgets and pricing. We exploit firms' practice of delegating advertising slot decisions to agencies to link consumer-level advertising variation to firms' strategic choices. Our results show that a sugar-sweetened beverage tax reduces advertising, while the additional impact of advertising restrictions is significantly weaker when a tax is already in place.

JEL-codes: D12 H22 I18 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium (2026)
Working Paper: The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium (2026)
Working Paper: The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium (2025)
Working Paper: The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium (2025)
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