An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy

Timothy Besley and Adam Brzezinski

No 18618, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper introduces deliberation into an economic model of policy making. A government decides whether to implement a policy which requires citizen compliance. The citizens' and government's objectives diverge since only the latter internalizes externalities. Hence, the government cannot credibly inform the citizens about policy effectiveness. However, it can introduce a deliberative process in which citizens can influence each other. We contrast deliberation driven by informative exchange with that affected by motivated reasoning and show that either type can improve welfare, even when beliefs polarize. Making the outcomes of deliberation binding can reduce welfare by disincentivizing the government from holding deliberations and from implementing policy.

Keywords: Democracy; Deliberation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
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