An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy

Timothy Besley

No 18618, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper develops a canonical model of deliberative democracy as part of a policy process. It studies how deliberation affects incentives and behavior in three contexts: (i) compliance with policies (ii) equilibrium policy choices in a representative democracy and (iii) incentives to protest. The paper explores whether there are welfare gains from increased deliberation and how these depend on changes in equilibrium behavior.

Keywords: Democracy; Deliberation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
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