Public Remembrance and Political Accountability under Autocracy: Evidence from Cambodia's Killing Fields

Bühler, Mathias and Andreas Madestam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mathias Bühler

No 18815, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How does public remembrance of state violence shape politics under authoritarian rule? We study this question using the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, where mass graves, memorials, and annual ceremonies sustain the memory of the atrocities. We approximate the regime's allocation of forced labor to identify localities where repression and mass death were concentrated. Four decades later, residents report lower trust, reduced civic participation, and greater fear of violence, yet they hold stronger democratic attitudes, turn out to vote at higher rates, and support the opposition. Repression exposure also constrains rent extraction by local officials, resulting in fewer land concessions and less deforestation. We trace these effects to public remembrance. Memorials are more common where repression was concentrated, and Day of Anger ceremonies amplify political engagement, increase protest activity, and further constrain local officials. Regime-sponsored commemoration, intended to legitimize incumbent rule, can thus become an "authoritarian commons," a public venue that citizens repurpose for coordination, turning collective memory into a constraint on power under autocracy.

Keywords: State repression; Political accountability; Collective memory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N45 O17 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
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