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Corporate payout policy: Are financial firms different?

Emmanuel Caiazzo, Leonardo Gambacorta, Tommaso Oliviero () and Hyun Song Shin

No 18882, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: It is well documented that financial firms display a larger corporate payout propensity than non-financial firms. By using an international sample of listed firms from advanced economies, we show that this difference vanishes after accounting for heterogeneity among corporations in their financial leverage, stock market liquidity and share-ownership by institutional investors. A theoretical model that builds on Acharya et al. (2017) provides a framework to analyze the effect of corporate structure on payout decisions and rationalizes the economic mechanisms behind our empirical results.

Keywords: Corporate pay out policy; Dividends; Financial Firms; Risk-shifting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
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