The Emergence of Government as Organized Violence-Cum-Robbery

Coen Teulings, Bas J.P. Van Bavel and Bram Van Besouw

No 18974, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The protracted emergence of hierarchical government is most clearly epitomized in the shift from tribal societies to chiefdoms, the two archetypical forms of societal organization at either side of the emergence of hierarchy. To explain this shift, we present a model of individual production and violence between ex ante homogeneous players, and endogenous private monitoring. We show that coalition formation is essential for hierarchies to emerge and that power within coalitions depends on monopolizing information rather than violence capacities. Also, we highlight the limits of hierarchical chiefdoms competing against tribes and thus help explain why the shift was that protracted.

Keywords: Neolithic; revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 N4 O43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
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