Geopolitical Risk and Decoupling: Evidence from U.S. Export Controls

Matteo Crosignani, Lina Han, Marco Macchiavelli and André Silva ()

No 18986, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Hegemonic countries safeguard their dominant position by maintaining technological leadership. To this end, the U.S. has imposed export controls to restrict China’s access to strategic, cutting-edge technologies. We document that these measures lead to an immediate, broad-based decoupling of supply chains, with U.S. suppliers more likely to end relations with Chinese customers—even those not directly targeted by the policy. However, we find no evidence of reshoring or friend-shoring in U.S. supply chains. Due to these disruptions, affected U.S. suppliers experience a $130 billion decline in market capitalization, along with reductions in profitability and employment.

JEL-codes: F38 F51 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18986 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18986

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18986

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().