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To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence

Toke S. Aidt, Facundo Albornoz and Esther Hauk

No 19073, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This article explores the complex interplay between deforestation policies and foreign influence, using a game theoretical model to analyze geopolitical factors influencing forest conservation decisions in countries with significant rainforests. The model highlights the conflicting interests of foreign powers – one aiming for economic benefits from agriculture and the other advocating for forest preservation due to environmental services. The paper demonstrates how domestic political dynamics and economic shocks influence the regulatory decisions on deforestation. This understanding is crucial for formulating strategies that balance developmental needs and global environmental concerns.

Keywords: Foreign influence; Deforestation; Food security; Brazil; China; Rainforest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O13 P33 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
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Journal Article: To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: To Cut or not to Cut: Deforestation Policy under the Shadow of Foreign Influence (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: To cut or not to cut: Deforestation policy under the shadow of foreign influence (2024) Downloads
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