The Dark Side of Infrastructure: Roads, Repression, and Land in Authoritarian Paraguay

Felipe Gonzalez, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Mounu Prem and Stephane Straub

No 19124, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Transportation infrastructure is associated with economic development, but it can also be used for social control and to benefit the governing elite. We explore the connection between the construction of road networks, state-led repression, and illegal land allocations in the longest dictatorship in South America: Alfredo Stroessner’s military regime in Paraguay. Using novel panel data from the truth and reconciliation commission, we show that proximity to newly constructed roads facilitated state-led repression, illegal allocation of agricultural plots to dictatorship allies, and hindered sustainable economic development in the following decades.

Keywords: Paraguay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H54 N46 N76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Dark Side of Infrastructure: Roads, Repression and Land in Authoritarian Paraguay (2025)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Infrastructure: Roads, Repression, and Land in Authoritarian Paraguay (2025)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Infrastructure: Roads, Repression, and Land in Authoritarian Paraguay (2023)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Infrastructure: Roads, Repression, and Land in Authoritarian Paraguay (2022)
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