Organized Labor Versus Robots? Evidence from Micro Data

Sebastian Findeisen, Wolfgang Dauth and Oliver Schlenker

No 19192, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: New technologies drive productivity growth but the distribution of gains might be unequal and is mediated by labor market institutions. We study the role that organized labor plays in shielding incumbent workers from the potential negative consequences of automation. Combining German individual-level administrative records with information on plant-level robot adoption and the presence of works councils, a form of shop-floor worker representation, we find positive moderating effects of works councils on retention for incumbent workers during automation events. Separations for workers with replaceable task profiles are significantly reduced. When labor markets are tight and replacement costs are high for firms, incumbent workers become more valuable and the effects of works councils during automation events start to disappear. Older workers, who find it more challenging to reallocate to new employers, benefit the most from organized labor in terms of wages employment. Concerning mechanisms we find that robot-adopting plants with works councils employ not more but higher quality robots. They also provide more training during robot adoption and have higher productivity growth thereafter.

JEL-codes: J20 J30 J53 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19192 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Organized labor versus robots? Evidence from micro data (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19192

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19192
orders@cepr.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).