Strategic complementarity in games
Xavier Vives and
Orestis Vravosinos
No 19214, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
The lattice-theoretic approach has had a significant impact in all fields of economics, being progressively incorporated into the standard toolbox. This paper presents a selective survey with an emphasis on basic tools, some important results, and applications in industrial organization, dynamic games, games of incomplete information, and mechanism design. Frontier theoretical research employing lattice-theoretic methods continues to be developed in areas such as mean-field games and information design.
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
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