A surprising hot-cold reciprocation gap

Riccardo Ghidoni, Sigrid Suetens and Jierui Yang

No 19248, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Experiments are conducted to investigate the effect of the decision mode on reciprocation in a one-shot trust game. Trustees either decided directly whether to reciprocate after observing their partner's choice or according to a contingent response plan made before observing their partner's choice. The main finding is that trustees were more likely to reciprocate under contingent decision making than under direct decision making. This reciprocation gap was not present when trust decisions were the outcome of a lottery, thus not made by trustors, which suggests that reciprocation choices must be the outcome of a commitment to reciprocate.

JEL-codes: C70 C90 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
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