Homothetic Non-CES Demand Systems with Applications to Monopolistic Competition

Kiminori Matsuyama

No 19376, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This article reviews homothetic non-CES demand systems and their implications when applied to monopolistic competition, to offer guidance to those looking for flexible and yet tractable ways of departing from CES. Under general homothetic symmetric non-CES, two measures, substitutability and love-for-variety, are introduced to identify the condition under which the equilibrium product variety is excessive or insufficient. Because homotheticity and symmetry alone impose little restriction to make further progress, we turn to the Homothetic Single Aggregator (H.S.A.) class. H.S.A. is more flexible than CES and translog, which are its special cases, and yet equally analytically tractable, because all cross-variety interactions are summarized by the single aggregator. Under H.S.A., substitutability is increasing in product variety iff Marshall’s 2nd law holds, which is a sufficient condition for love-for-variety to be diminishing in product variety and for the equilibrium product variety to be excessive. Monopolistic competition under H.S.A. remains tractable even under various forms of firm heterogeneity and in multi-market settings.

Keywords: Substitutability vs love-for-variety; Equilibrium vs optimal; Homothetic single aggregator; 2nd and 3rd laws of demand; Firm heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
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