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Elite Universities and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human and Social Capital

Andres Barrios Fernandez, Christopher Neilson and Seth Zimmerman

No 19431, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Do elite colleges help talented students join the social elite, or help incumbent elites retain their positions? We combine intergenerationally-linked data from Chile with a regression discontinuity design to show that, looking across generations, elite colleges do both. Lower-status individuals who gain admission to elite college programs transform their children’s social environment. Children become more likely to attend highstatus private schools and colleges, and to live near and befriend high-status peers. In contrast, academic achievement is unaffected. Simulations combining descriptive and quasi-experimental findings show that elite colleges tighten the link between social and human capital while decreasing intergenerational social mobility.

JEL-codes: D64 I24 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09
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Working Paper: Elite universities and the intergenerational transmission of human and social capital (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Elite universities and the intergenerational transmission of human and social capital (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Elite Universities and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human and Social Capital (2024) Downloads
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