Still Too Big To Fail? Lessons from the first post-Lehman failure of a global systemically important bank

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

No 19554, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: After a decade of reforms aimed at ensuring no bank is too-big-to-fail, the collapse of Credit Suisse served as the first real-life test of this framework. A resolution following the international and Swiss too-big-to-fail framework would have involved recapitalising Credit Suisse by bailing in all loss-absorbing capital. Instead, Swiss authorities opted for a state-supported acquisition of Credit Suisse by UBS. This raised concerns about the applicability of the entire too-big-to-fail regime, leading some observers to dismiss it entirely. In the ongoing discussion on the regulatory implications of this near miss, a series of reports have made numerous recommendations. This paper argues that the focus should be on necessary reforms to ensure that taxpayers do not bear the risk of the failure of a global systemically important bank. Reforms should enhance the robustness and credibility of the bail-in resolution regime. At a minimum, this means ensuring cross-border legal certainty of bail-in, securing funding in resolution, and expanding resolution options. Additionally, a proposed special recovery regime for global systemically important banks should mandate early supervisory intervention, ensure timely restructuring, and provide adequate capitalisation.

Keywords: Too big to fail; Resolution regimes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F30 G20 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
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