The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair

Marek Pycia and Peter Troyan

No 19689, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Random Priority is a popular mechanism used to allocate a set of objects to a set of agents without the use of monetary transfers. Random Priority is appealing because it satisfies desirable efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties. Is it the only mechanism with these properties? We answer this long-standing question in the positive: Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is Pareto efficient, symmetric, and obviously strategy-proof.

Date: 2024-11
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