Initial Match and Career Outcomes: Evidence from the NFL Draft

Pablo Casas-Arce, Stephen Hansen, Miguel Martinez-Carrasco and Asis Martinez-Jerez

No 19721, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A growing literature argues that firms contribute to worker inequality, but a persistent challenge is that similar workers are typically not randomly matched with different firms. We exploit the National Football League draft rules which quasi-exogenously allocate new players of similar ability to teams of different quality. After an initial employment period, the market is generally competitive. We find no substantial effect of initial team quality on cumulative career performance or wages. This suggests that, in labor markets with relatively few frictions, inequality in career outcomes is driven mostly by individual rather than firm effects.

Keywords: Matching; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J62 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
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