Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilization Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization and EMU

Tamim Bayoumi and Paul Masson

No 1984, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper looks at theoretical and empirical issues associated with the operation of fiscal stabilizers within an economy. It argues that such stabilizers operate most effectively at a national, rather than local, level. As differing cycles across regions tend to offset each other for the country as a whole, national fiscal stabilizers are not associated with the same increase in future tax liabilities for the region as local ones. Accordingly, the negative impact from the Ricardian effects associated with these tax liabilities is smaller. Empirical work on data across Canadian provinces indicates that local stabilizers are only one-third to one-half as effective as national stabilizers which create no future tax liability.

Keywords: Fiscal Stabilization; levels of government; Ricardian Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 H31 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Liability-Creating versus Non-liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilisation Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilisation, and EMU (1998)
Working Paper: Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilization Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization, and EMU (1998)
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