An Experiment on Behavior in Queues

Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, Brian Rogers and Chen Wei

No 19876, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In a dynamic allocation setup, we experimentally study agents’ choices under the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) and Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) queuing protocols. We find that agents are nearly rational under FIFO but tend to be overselective under LIFO. Within the model that anchors our experiment, we show that the magnitude of such an excessively selective bias reduces the welfare performance gap between FIFO and LIFO. Given the strategic complementarities inherent in LIFO, an agent’s overselective behavior may arise from beliefs that others will act overselectively. Yet, we show that overselection persists in a supplemental treatment where subjects interact with nonstrategic robots.

Keywords: Queuing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
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