Why Firms Lay Off Workers Instead of Cutting Wages: Evidence From Linked Survey-Administrative Data

Antoine Bertheau, Marianna Kudlyak, Birthe Larsen and Morten Bennedsen

No 19940, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We use a novel large-scale survey of firms, implemented in Denmark in 2021 and linked to administrative data, to study why firms lay off workers instead of cutting wages. Our questions on layoffs, wage cuts, and the link between them provide new insights into firms' strategies for adjusting labor in response to adverse shocks. We find that layoffs are more prevalent than wage cuts, but wage cuts are not rare in firms experiencing revenue reduction and were used by 15% of such firms. Employers are hesitant to cut wages in many instances because they see wage cuts as a poor substitute for layoffs. First, firms report that lowering wages triggers costs through the impact on morale and quits. Comparing these costs with potential savings from wage cuts, most employers in the survey agree that a wage reduction would not have saved jobs. Second, firms report that a crisis is an opportune time for layoffs because of lower opportunity costs of restructuring and because layoffs during a crisis are perceived by workers as more fair. We find that firms that report such opportunistic layoffs are less likely to implement wage cuts.

JEL-codes: D22 J23 J30 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19940 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19940

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19940

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().