EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An EMU with Different Transmission Mechanisms

Giorgia Giovannetti () and Ramon Marimon

No 2016, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop and compute a dynamic equilibrium model where economies differ on the relative efficiency of financial intermediaries and, therefore on households portfolios and currency holdings. Our model economies have some of the features of the different financial structures in countries of the European Union and respond to monetary shocks in a way similar to the observed responses, which we also estimate. It follows that if differences on the relative efficiency of financial intermediaries persist in a monetary union, conflicts of interests in the pursuit of a common monetary policy can arise.

Keywords: ECB; limited participation; Monetary Policy; Transmission Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E52 F30 F33 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2016 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2016

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=2016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2016