Ballot Richness and Information Aggregation

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Macé, Antonin and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 20173, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study voting when voters have different information quality. In such environments, voting rules with richer ballot spaces can help voters better aggregate information by endogenously allocating more decision power to better-informed members. Using laboratory experiments, we compare two polar examples of voting rules in terms of ballot richness: majority voting (MV) and continuous voting (CV). Our results show that CV outperforms MV on average, although the difference is smaller than predicted, and that CV has more support than MV in treatments where it is expected to perform better. We also find that voters with intermediate information overestimate the importance of their votes under CV.

JEL-codes: D72 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
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