Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in Elections

Amanda de Albuquerque, Frederico Finan, Anubhav Jha, Laura Karpuska and Francesco Trebbi

No 20291, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present a methodology for decoupling taste-based versus statistical discrimination in political behavior. We combine a flexible empirical model of voting, featuring vertical and horizontal candidate differentiation in gender, ability, and policy positions, with a large-scale micro-targeted electoral experiment aimed at increasing female candidate vote shares. Our structural econometric approach allows to separately identify preference parameters driving taste-based discrimination and beliefs parameters driving statistical discrimination through expectations about ability and policy positions of female politicians. Our application to Brazilian municipal elections uncovers substantial levels of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Counterfactual political campaigns show promise in reducing both.

Keywords: Discrimination; Elections; Identity; Gender; Ability; Policy; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P0 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
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