Entrenched Political Dynasties and Development Under Competitive Clientelism: Evidence from Pakistan

Rinchan Mirza, Adeel Malik and Jean-Philippe Platteau

No 20347, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How political dynasties affect economic development in the context of poor countries is a moot question. Theoretical predictions do not yield a clear answer and empirical studies remain few. In this paper, we estimate the impact of entrenched political dynasties on local development in Pakistan’s largest province, Punjab. Toward this purpose, we compile an original database on political genealogies, which includes information about the personal and family characteristics of both elected representatives and the main contenders in elections for the last one hundred years covering both elections held under colonial rule and Pakistan’s modern political existence. Three main findings emerge. First, entrenched political dynasties are historical families whose influence dates back to the colonial period. Second, using a close elections regression discontinuity design, we show that historical families have a worse development impact than non-historic families. Third, based on complementary surveys, we argue that segmented political markets simultaneously account for the long-term persistence of historic families and their negative development impact under conditions of competitive clientelism.

JEL-codes: D02 D72 H70 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06
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