Can Democracy Cope with Extreme Views?

Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider and Oriol Tejada

No 20435, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how democracies can manage extremist minority views through Coalition-Preclusion Promises (CPPs), where parties credibly commit to excluding extremists from governing coalitions. We identify conditions under which CPPs improve social welfare by preventing extreme policy shifts. However, these benefits depend on parties’ incentives and voters’ ability to coordinate. The resulting voting game features multiple equilibria, and we extend typical equilibrium selection criteria. Our findings suggest CPPs can be an effective strategy to keep extremist parties out of government.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Political contracts; Elections; Government formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
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