Protected but Punished? Wage Effects of Whistleblower Protection

Jae Cho, Jinju Rhee and Tobias Kretschmer

No 20546, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine the impact of whistleblowing protection laws on wages, integrating both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We find that strengthened legal protection leads to significant shifts in wage levels, highlighting an unexpected consequence of these legal changes. Specifically, companies with a history of misconduct may lower wages for their employees in response to enhanced whistleblower protection. Our analysis indicates that this wage decline is largely driven by the use of secrecy terms, such as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).

JEL-codes: J50 K42 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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