Political Polarization and Human Capital Allocation

David Martinez-Miera and Carlos Sunyer

No 20682, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper provides empirical evidence on the negative effects of political polarization on human capital allocation and hospital outcomes. Levering Spain’s centralized rank-based system for allocating recently graduated doctors to hospitals, we obtain (i) a precise measure of each doctor’s quality and (ii) their work-location choices. Exploiting a plausibly exogenous increase in political polarization in a Spanish region, we find that polarization reduces the average quality of incoming doctors, as higher-ranked candidates become less likely to select positions in the affected region. Examining the underlying mechanisms, we find evidence consistent with conflict avoidance rather than ideological sorting. Consistent with the documented decrease in doctors’ quality, we document an increase in risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality rates. Our findings highlight the broader economic and social costs of political polarization, particularly its impact on the distribution of skilled professionals and health.

Keywords: Health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I12 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
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