Beyond ESG: Executive Pay Metrics and Shareholder Support

Nickolay Gantchev, Mariassunta Giannetti and Marcus Hober

No 20818, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using a novel global dataset of executive pay contracts, we show that the surge in ESG and other compensation metrics is more about securing shareholder consent than directing managerial effort. ESG metrics – classified according to SASB standards – are often added in areas of existing strength, with negligible impact on overall ESG outcomes. Instead, metrics of any type are added after high say-on-pay dissent and are often chosen to align with proxy advisors’ preferences. Pay metrics increase say-on-pay approval and reduce both shareholder proposals and shareholder dissent on managerial proposals. These findings challenge contract theory’s prediction that metrics are selected to direct attention to neglected objectives and suggest that the surge in ESG and other metrics reflects conformity pressures and the desire to appease shareholders.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Shareholder voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 J33 M12 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
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