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A Dollar for Your Data: Connectivity in the Wake of Apple's Tracking Transparency Policy

Francesca Hueller, Elena Novelli, Paolo Aversa and Tobias Kretschmer

No 20887, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine how a platform’s governance shock reshapes the strategic value of app connectivity. We distinguish between connectivity’s functional value and commercial value. We theorize that governance interventions restricting access to directly monetizable user-level data reduce the commercial returns to connectivity while leaving functional incentives unchanged. Leveraging Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) policy—a shock that curtailed cross-app tracking—we analyze nearly 1,000 Health & Fitness apps on iOS and Android from 2018 to 2021. We find that applications with greater pre-ATT exposure to connected data along the 3Vs (Volume, Variety, Velocity) significantly reduce connectivity after the shock relative to Android counterparts, especially tracking-intensive and single-homing applications. Connectivity’s performance benefits weaken after ATT. Our findings clarify how platform governance reshapes complementors’ incentives.

Keywords: Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
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