Polygyny and the Economic Determinants of Family Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Augustin Tapsoba

No 20936, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Social norms and formal institutions governing marriage markets vary widely across societies. This paper examines how polygyny norms in Sub-Saharan Africa shape marriage market responses to aggregate economic shocks and the resulting welfare implications. Contrary to monogamous markets, polygynous markets feature intense competition for brides between young bachelors and older married men seeking a second (junior) wife. In this paper, I show both theoretically and empirically that the latter group is more responsive than the former to aggregate income shocks in areas where the shadow price of marrying a junior wife is low. This difference in sensitivity leads to distinct equilibrium market outcomes: adverse shocks increase the quantity of child marriages in monogamous areas but have no detectable effect in polygynous areas. These divergent equilibrium outcomes result in drastic differences in the long-term impact of these shocks on female education, literacy, and the utilization of preventive care services.

Keywords: Marriage; market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
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