Random Connections and Violence in the French Revolution

Brenda Van Coppenolle and Oliver Vanden Eynde

No 21171, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Networks can help political actors survive violence in revolutions. Connections could protect against reprisals and provide information. However, personal networks are not randomly assigned, making it difficult to causally trace their role. The French Constituent Assembly of 1789 randomly assigned legislators to smaller groups, which we use to assess outcomes in the ensuing revolution such as violent death and emigration. Violent death was contagious among the nobility in these networks. However, connections to two key leaders, Lafayette and Robespierre, were protective against violent death, encouraging emigration, regardless of ideological differences. We argue that nobles drew an informational advantage from their connections.

Keywords: Historical political economy; French revolution; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
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