Geopolitics in the Evaluation of International Scientific Collaboration

Alexander Furnas, Ruixue Jia, Margaret Roberts and Dashun Wang

No 21173, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This study provides evidence that geopolitical considerations systematically shape funding evaluations of international collaboration proposals. We examine this dynamic in the consequential context of U.S.–China collaboration. Across two large-scale randomized experiments with U.S. policymakers and U.S.-based scientists, we find substantial and consistent penalties for proposals involving China-based collaborators. Policymakers express much greater unconditional support for proposals with Germany-based collaborators than for otherwise identical proposals with China-based collaborators (68% vs. 28%). Crucially, this penalty is not confined to policymakers: scientists themselves exhibit a sizeable 18 percentage-point gap (48% vs. 30%), despite professional expectations of merit-based evaluation. Much of the difference reflects a shift from unconditional to conditional approval rather than outright rejection. These penalties are remarkably consistent across scientific fields and respondent characteristics, with little evidence of heterogeneity, indicating that they reflect geopolitical rather than domain-specific concerns. Overall, the findings suggest that geopolitics influences gatekeeping judgments in government funding, with broad implications for peer review, scientific norms, and the future of international collaboration in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

Keywords: Science evaluation; Peer review; International collaboration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F52 H41 H57 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21173 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21173

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21173

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().