Strategic Complementarities in a Dynamic Model of Technology Adoption: P2P Digital Payments

Fernando Alvarez, David Argente, Francesco Lippi, Esteban Mendez-Chacon and Diana Van Patten

No 21211, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of technology adoption featuring strategic complementarities: the benefits of the technology increase with the number of adopters. We show that complementarities give rise to gradual adoption, multiple equilibria, multiple steady states, and suboptimal allocations. We study the planner’s problem and its implementation through adoption subsidies. We apply the theory to SINPE Movil, a peer-to-peer payment app developed by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Using transaction-level data and user-specific networks that we construct from administrative records, we causally estimate sizable complementarities. In our calibrated model, the optimal subsidy pushes the economy to universal adoption.

JEL-codes: E4 E5 O1 O2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
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