Whataboutism

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

No 21395, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We propose a model of whataboutism — a rhetorical strategy that deflects criticism by invoking analogous, yet internally uncriticized, misconduct on the critic's side — and study its implications for social norms governing offensive speech. In an infinite-horizon psychological game with two rival camps, agents weigh the intrinsic benefit of offensive speech against the risk of effective condemnation. External criticism can be rendered ineffective via an equilibrium-based whataboutism rebuttal. We characterize the unique dynamically stable Psychological Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and show that the availability of whataboutism exacerbates offensive speech, such that civility norms can break down entirely, especially in polarized societies.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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