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Farmers as Voters: Land Redistribution and Regime Consolidation in Zimbabwe

Rob Davies, Halvor Mehlum, Kalle Moene and Ragnar Torvik

No 21396, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The relationship between land reform and electoral support for the government is crucial for countries considering any form of asset redistribution. We develop a unique data set for Zimbabwe, in which we combine data for 19,374 farm redistributed properties and other estates, with election results from 1,960 wards in the presidential election in 2018. The farm data are collected in the midst of the land reform in Zimbabwe, and make it possible to analyze how a massive and national land reform goes hand in hand with the support for the long-term ruling party in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF. The results show that for every percent of a rural ward's land area that was subject to land redistribution, the support for ZANU-PF increases by a quarter of a percentage point. The results are compatible both with a mechanism of gratitude from the beneficiaries and with a precautionary strategy where beneficiaries want to block regime change and potential reversal of the redistribution.

Keywords: Land; reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P48 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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