Do Female Leaders Reduce Corruption? New Evidence from Brazil

Julieta Peveri and Clemence Tricaud

No 21568, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Does female leadership reduce corruption? We study this question using close mixed-gender elections in Brazilian municipalities over two decades and multiple measures of corruption: budget-based predicted corruption scores, audit irregularities, and legal sanctions. We find no evidence that electing a woman mayor affects corruption. This null result holds across time periods, mayor characteristics, and the electoral cycle. We only detect a negative effect in the small subsample of municipalities randomly audited in early terms, which coincides with a sharp imbalance in incumbency. Because incumbency directly impacts corruption, these previously documented effects likely reflect the impact of incumbency rather than gender.

Keywords: Gender; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
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