Interdependent Hitting Times

Jaap Abbring and Yifan Yu

No 21593, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper studies interdependent durations as equilibrium outcomes of a synchronization game, a continuous-time stopping game in which the incentive to stop increases when other players stop. We allow the payoffs to vary with both common shocks and observed and unobserved agent characteristics. The common shocks follow a spectrally negative Lévy process, a semiparametric process that includes Brownian motion as a special case but may also have jumps. We show that equilibrium outcomes can be represented as interdependent hitting times and use this to establish the game's nonparametric identification from data on stopping times and covariates. We develop maximum simulated likelihood and method of simulated moments estimators and evaluate their finite-sample and computational performance in Monte Carlo experiments. The results provide a tractable framework for identifying and estimating synchronization games from interdependent duration data.

JEL-codes: C14 C41 C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
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