Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence

Tullio Jappelli () and Marco Pagano

No 2184, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and proxies for default rates are lower in countries where lenders share information, regardless of the private or public nature of the information sharing mechanism. We also find that public intervention is more likely where private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously and creditor rights are poorly protected.

Keywords: Credit Market; Default Rate; Information Sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country evidence (2002)
Working Paper: Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence (1999)
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