EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Limits of Verifiability: Credibility and Flexibility in Communication

Alessandro Lizzeri, Yichuan Lou and Jacopo Perego

No 21900, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We compare verifiable and unverifiable communication in a sender- receiver setting with partially aligned preferences, where the sender knows more than what her evidence can prove. We identify a credibility–flexibility tradeoff: tying the sender’s claims to her evidence enhances her credibility, but limits how flexibly she can communicate when her evidence does not accurately reflect her private information. This tradeoff changes the economics of verifiable disclosure. When preferences are sufficiently aligned, full evidence disclosure is neither sustainable in equilibrium nor efficient. We show that verifiability facilitates communication when preferences are sufficiently misaligned, but hinders it when they are sufficiently aligned, suggesting that institutions that impose verification need not always improve information transmission. Finally, we study how verifiable and unverifiable communication can complement one another when both are available: unverifiable communication can contextualize verifiable evidence when the latter is misleading.

Keywords: Information; transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21900 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21900

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21900

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().

 
Page updated 2026-09-07
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21900