Beyond Optimization and Blind Selection: Reflexive Agency in Economic Evolution

Dennis Snower

No 21903, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Evolutionary economics explains economic change through variation, selection, retention, transmission, innovation, and institutional transformation, whereas much of economics explains outcomes through purposive choice. This article argues that these modes of explanation become recursively connected once economic agents can represent the evolutionary processes in which they participate and intentionally alter their operation. It develops the concept of reflexive economic evolution: agents do not merely choose within given constraints or adapt to existing selection pressures, but can generate new possibilities, modify selection environments, organize transmission, and sometimes revise the criteria and mechanisms by which variants are selected. This latter second-order capacity is termed meta-selection. Reflexive economic evolution does not imply comprehensive control or a predetermined social end-state: guidance changes the distribution of possible trajectories under uncertainty rather than determining a trajectory. The framework shows how intentional and evolutionary explanations can be causally complementary, why effective agency is partly endogenous, and why policy should be understood not only as changing current outcomes but also as reshaping the evolutionary environment in which subsequent adaptation and innovation occur.

Keywords: Evolutionary economics; economic methodology; Institutions; Agency; Reflexivity; Causation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 B52 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21903 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21903

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21903

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().