The Karenina Principle: A Decision Rule for Contradicting Requirements

Anders Levermann

No 21960, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We propose the Generalized Karenina Principle as a decision rationale for allocating a finite resource among essential requirements. Beyond competing for resources, requirements may be contradictory: gratifying one can directly impair another. Maximizing a multiplicative measure of success yields an adaptive rule that restores the optimal balance among gratification levels. In the two-requirement model, interior Karenina-optimal allocation remains locally stable as contradiction increases, whereas needresponsive allocation can generate destabilizing overcompensation. With interacting decision makers, Karenina-optimal reallocation also raises the threshold for collective instability. The principle bases adaptive allocation on restoring optimal gratification ratios rather than responding to individual deficits.

Keywords: Decision-making; Time allocation; Resource shares (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 D01 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
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