Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule

Mika Widgrén

No 2207, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the decision-making game. The paper shows that in common policies there are no designs that lead to both types of efficiency but flexible integration is a way to achieve both.

Keywords: Incomplete Contracts; Integration; Legislative Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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