Central Bank Retail Deposits in the Past

Pamfili Antipa, Anna Grodecka-Messi, Marius Hafke, Clemens Jobst, Enrique Jorge Sotelo, Daniel Kaufmann, Eva Mulder, Kilian Rieder and Stefano Ugolini

No 22119, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: European central banks historically offered deposit accounts to individuals and firms other than banks - the closest precedent for retail central bank digital currency. Using novel evidence, we show that these accounts served payment, liquidity management and store-of-value functions. Access to accounts was broad on paper, but narrow in practice due to discretionary introduction criteria, minimum balances, fees, and the absence of remuneration. Under the Gold Standard, central bank retail deposits were often not neutral for monetary policy. During panics, the accounts provided a safe haven. The resulting deposit outflows contracted commercial banks' balance sheets but were not always persistent.

Keywords: Central bank digital currency; Central banking; Monetary policy; Financial panic; bank disintermediation; retail deposits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 G21 N13 N23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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