Incentivizing Inflation Expectations

Sergii Drobot, Daniela Puzzello, Ryan Rholes and Alena Wabitsch

No 22125, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Inflation expectations are central to macroeconomics, yet surveys elicit them without marginal incentives for accuracy. In a multi-wave survey experiment, incentives change reported expectations: they reduce upward bias by 2.3-3.4 percentage points, disagreement by one-third, close the gender gap, and double learning rates in an RCT - all without increasing participant remuneration. Incentives raise effort and attention, not search or strategic behavior, and make expectations more informative about consumption plans. Because these effects are larger when baseline attention to inflation is low, unincentivized elicitation generates state-dependent measurement error, with important implications for empirical research, model calibration, and monetary policy.

Keywords: Inflation expectations; Survey methods; Monetray policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C83 E31 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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