Presidential Appointments to the Federal Reserve Board

Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia

No 22126, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Appointments to the Federal Reserve Board allow U.S. presidents to influence monetary policy. Due to early Board departures and Senate confirmation delays, the ratio of politically appointed governors to Bank presidents in the FOMC varies over time. We exploit this time variation to estimate dynamic causal effects of presidential appointments using external instruments based on institutional and political features. Appointments causally predict a more expansionary monetary policy in the short run and an increase in inflation in the medium run. Electoral and partisan considerations induce stronger effects when the expansionary policy may benefit the nominating president’s party in upcoming elections.

Keywords: political pressure; Monetary policy; Fomc; dynamic causal effects. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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